

# SOC 2 Control Narrative



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### Area: Cryptographic Key Management & Sensitive Data Protection

### Framework Alignment: SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria (Security, Confidentiality)

[SOC 2 \(System and Organization Controls 2\)](#) is an auditing procedure developed by the [AICPA](#) that ensures service providers manage customer data securely. It assesses controls—specifically security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality, and privacy—to build trust, enhance reputation, and reduce data breach risks.

### Control Objective

Sensitive financial data is protected using strong encryption and controlled key management processes such that:

- Confidential data is encrypted at rest and in transit
- Cryptographic keys are securely generated, stored, rotated, and destroyed
- Access to decryption capabilities is restricted, authenticated, and auditable

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### Control Design

#### CC6.1 / CC6.6 — Logical Access & Least Privilege

Access to cryptographic operations is restricted to a single backend service role with explicitly defined permissions:

- kms:GenerateDataKey
- kms:Decrypt
- kms:DescribeKey

No human users are granted direct cryptographic access to production keys.

Administrative users are limited to key lifecycle management and do not possess decrypt permissions.

This enforces **separation of duties** between:

- Key administration
- Cryptographic usage

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#### CC6.7 — Credential Management

The system does not rely on long-lived credentials.



Instead:

- Access to AWS resources is obtained via **federated identity (OIDC)**
- Credentials are issued dynamically using **AWS STS**
- All credentials are **short-lived and automatically expire**

This eliminates:

- Static secrets in application code or configuration
  - Credential rotation risk
  - Exposure through repository or environment leakage
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### **CC7.2 — Change Management (Cryptographic Configuration)**

Changes to key policies, IAM roles, or cryptographic configuration require:

- Administrative access to AWS IAM/KMS
- Explicit modification of key policies or role permissions
- Audit logging via AWS CloudTrail

All changes are:

- Logged
  - Attributable to a specific identity
  - Reviewable post hoc
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### **CC7.3 — Monitoring & Detection**

All cryptographic operations are logged via **AWS CloudTrail**, including:

- GenerateDataKey
- Decrypt
- Role assumption events (AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity)

Logs include:

- Timestamp
- Calling principal
- Source IP / service context
- Encryption context metadata

These logs support:

- Anomaly detection
  - Incident investigation
  - Compliance evidence
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### **CC8.1 — Encryption & Key Management**

Sensitive data is protected using **envelope encryption**:

#### **Key Structure**

- Master keys: AWS KMS Customer-Managed Keys (HSM-backed)
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- Data encryption keys: generated per record via KMS

### **Encryption Process**

1. Application requests a data key from AWS KMS
2. Data is encrypted locally using AES-256-GCM
3. Encrypted data key and ciphertext are stored

### **Decryption Process**

1. Encrypted data key is sent to AWS KMS
2. KMS returns plaintext data key
3. Data is decrypted in memory only

No plaintext sensitive data is stored at rest.

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## **CC8.2 — Data Confidentiality**

The following fields are encrypted at the application layer:

- Bank account numbers
- Routing numbers
- Third-party financial access tokens

Controls include:

- Immediate encryption upon ingestion
  - No persistence of plaintext values
  - Masking for display (e.g., last 4 digits only)
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## **CC8.3 — Key Protection**

AWS KMS provides:

- Hardware-backed key storage (HSM)
- Access control via key policies and IAM
- Automatic key rotation (where enabled)
- Separation of key material from application infrastructure

Application systems never have direct access to master key material.

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## **CC9.2 — Data Retention & Minimization**

The system enforces:

- Storage of only necessary sensitive data
- Avoidance of redundant duplication
- Separation of sensitive vs. non-sensitive fields

Where possible, tokenization or third-party custody is preferred over storage.

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## **Control Effectiveness**

The controls are effective because:

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- Cryptographic keys are never exposed outside AWS KMS
- Access is limited to a single, scoped service role
- All usage is logged and auditable
- No plaintext sensitive data is persisted
- Credential compromise risk is minimized via federation

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